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MARKETING MISSOURI RIVER WATER:  COMPETING 
PLANS FOR COMMODITIZING A NATURAL RESOURCE 
JOHN H. DAVIDSON 
ABSTRACT 
 
 The Missouri River ran free across a large piece of the North American 
continent until, during the 1940s, accumulated national and regional 
economic concerns led to comprehensive federal development.  Six vast 
dams were constructed on the main channel, impounding somewhere near 
seventy-five million acre-feet of water, controlling floods and  generating 
electricity, while supporting navigation, recreation and wildlife.  As the 
twentieth century closed it had become apparent that the larger portion of 
the waters impounded in the federal reservoirs were not allocated to or in 
demand for any project purposes, and therefore available for use.  
Somewhat remote geography and a lack of demand in the vicinity of the 
reservoirs proved to be temporarily insulating, allowing the growth of a 
recreation industry around the reservoirs.  This period of repose may now 
be closing.  The advance of pipeline technology now makes long distance 
water transfers to water short economies in the south and west feasible.  
Closer-in, immediate demand for withdrawals exists to support energy 
fields in and around North Dakota.  This Essay attempts to briefly describe 
previous and current efforts to market reservoir waters, and provides details 
of the federal laws which authorize water marketing.  The larger purpose, 
however, is to initiate discussion of the significant policy questions which 
the author believes will be raised in the near future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Crowding of the continent, demand for land, water, air, and minerals, 
along with the intensification of agricultural production are ever-present 
themes in natural resources policy.  Every place and activity now seems to 
affect every other.  The advance of technologies magnifies scale while 
collapsing time and distance, leading inevitably toward tension over control 
and access to coveted but limited resources. 
Resisting change are the communities, individuals, economies, and 
political entities located near, and currently reliant upon, the natural 
resources, particularly water, forest, air, and open space, which represent 
amenity, ecosystem and economic values.  Such resources are typically seen 
as uniquely local or regional assets—in some way proprietary—leading to 
an assumption that current uses and enjoyment will continue.  This repose is 
usually the result of reliance on some combination of laws, geography, 
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history, political power and economic investment.  Yet, legal jurisdiction 
over natural resources is seldom confined to state or local law.  In the 
typical case, there is a strong federal presence due to land ownership, 
sovereign obligations, or heavy federal investment, resulting in a national 
public interest that may appear to be in competition with both state and 
local expectations.  In addition, where a resource extends across state 
boundaries, interstate competition may defeat cooperation. 
Thus, the case of the Missouri River combining all of these elements.  
The economic values associated with the River today result from a huge 
federal development program, the benefits of which extend beyond the 
basin states to the national economy.  In time, the benefits of this federal 
investment may shift sharply in favor of out-of-basin uses.  Meanwhile, the 
states in the basin have failed to cooperate in managing the river, and 
instead, each state has vigorously asserted its most parochial interests. 
II. THE MISSOURI RIVER 
The Missouri River is the longest river in the United States.  Its 2,540 
miles drain one-sixth of the continent, stretching from headwaters in 
Wyoming and Montana to its mouth deep in the State of Missouri, where it 
spills into the Mississippi River, providing it with the water necessary to 
carry the nation’s commerce to the Gulf of Mexico.  Equally as important, a 
series of six massive reservoirs have been constructed on the river’s main 
channel, creating three of the five largest man-made lakes in the United 
States.  With a combined storage capacity of seventy-four million acre-feet, 
it is the largest system of reservoirs in the United States.1  In the upper 
basin, the two large reservoirs, behind Garrison Dam in North Dakota and 
Oahe Dam in South Dakota, together store in excess of 46.9 million acre-
feet of mountain and prairie runoff.2  The Missouri River below the dams 
flows into the lower basin, where it is channeled within levees and provides 
a free-flowing navigation channel to the Mississippi. 
The Missouri River Basin encompasses ten states, several Canadian 
provinces, twenty-five Indian tribes, and nearly the full range of human 
land uses.3  It includes major metropolitan areas, relatively unpopulated 
expanses, sub-humid dry lands in the upper basin, and lands of water 
 
1. JOHN R. FERRELL, BIG DAM ERA:  A LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE 
PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM xii (1993). 
2. North Dakota v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 264 F. Supp. 2d 871, 874-75 (D. N.D. 2003). 
3. See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, The Missouri River, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, 
Pt. XI (A.K. Kelley ed., 2012). 
           
4 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:1 
abundance in the lower.4  Its modern history is that of conflict between the 
upper and lower basins, and the inability of basin states to achieve any level 
of accord in river management.  In sum, the basin, as developed, enjoys an 
abundance of stored water. 
This essay argues that an abundance of stored and flowing water will 
inevitably attract interest from geographical areas not so endowed and by 
municipal and industrial interests in pursuit of reliable new supplies.  
Assuming that such interest does or will soon exist, questions emerge.  Is 
there a legal structure and process available that provides for the transfer of 
water from Missouri River reservoirs?  Is use of the reservoir water limited 
to the river’s basin, or can the waters be transported for use out of the 
basin?  Do the basin states and Indian tribes have rights to any of the stored 
water in the reservoirs and, if so, by what process are they able to exercise 
control?  Are there enforceable rules that assure that the River’s ecosystem 
retains a natural vitality? 
III. INDUSTRIAL WATER MARKETING UNDER THE FLOOD 
CONTROL ACT OF 1944 
The river of Lewis and Clark and the Missouri River ecosystem 
underwent lasting alteration by a massive water development known as the 
Pick-Sloan Plan, created by the Flood Control Act of 1944 (“FCA 1944”).5  
The project combined two movements prevalent in the early part of the last 
century.  First, the progressive conservation movement was committed to 
the idea that multiple-purpose, basin-wide water development projects 
could stimulate economic growth in arid or economically under-developed 
regions.  Second, the arid lands reclamation, or irrigation, movement, which 
was promoted by land development and irrigation enthusiasts.6  Political 
momentum for the project resulted from prolonged drought in the 1930s, 
promotion by navigation and irrigation interests, a desire for public works 
projects to reduce unemployment and provide work for returning soldiers, 
and the effects on the lower basin of several large floods.7  The final 
legislation was the result of the reconciliation of two separate and 
conflicting plans for development of the Basin.  The report for the U.S. 
 
4. A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT 
PLAINS NAT. RES. J. 1, 2 (1997); Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River 
Management, 83 NEB. L. REV. 305, 307 (2004). 
5 Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887 (1944), (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 460d, 
825s; 33 U.S.C. §§ 701-1, 701a-1, 701b-1, 708, 709; 43 U.S.C. § 390; and notes at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 
701c, f & j (2006)). 
6. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE MISSOURI RIVER ECOSYSTEM: EXPLORING THE 
PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY 28 (2002). 
7 Id. at 28-29, and FERRELL, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
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Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) was prepared by Colonel Lewis A. 
Pick.8  The report for the Bureau of Reclamation (“Bureau”) was prepared 
by W.G. Sloan.9  The Corp’s plan emphasized flood control and navigation 
utilizing large dams and reservoirs on the main stem of the River.  The 
Bureau’s goals were irrigation and hydropower, and proposed 
approximately ninety dams and reservoirs, along with several hundred 
irrigation projects.10  Both plans included varying numbers of large 
mainstem reservoirs.  After negotiations, the two plans were reconciled,11 
and enacted into law, with legislative recognition and incorporation by 
reference to the reconciled plans.12  Although formally reconciled, the two 
plans were far from a compromise.  The legislation “was an impossible 
attempt to satisfy the competing agencies [which] . . . contained nearly 
every project proposed in both Pick’s and Sloan’s plans.”13  In fact, the 
legislation included inconsistencies and conflicts, and was passed on a hope 
“that the engineers would manage the abundant water resources of the basin 
in a manner that would avert potential conflict.”14  The legal, political, and 
physical history of the Act is of the struggle to deal with the inherent 
problems.  In many respects, this has been the case.  Five mainstem dams 
were constructed, and the pre-existing Fort Peck reservoir was integrated 
into the system.  Each dam generates hydroelectricity, provides partial 
protection from floods to cities and farms downstream and allows for 
management of flows to support navigation seasons in most years.  In 
addition, the reservoirs themselves now support recreation industries.  
Numerous irrigation works have been constructed upstream of the Dakotas, 
although the Sloan Plan’s dream of a vast irrigation regime across both 
Dakotas is unrealized.15  In the broadest sense, the clear purpose of the 
Pick-Sloan legislation was economic stimulus through agricultural and 
 
8. Pick Plan, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN:  LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, H.R. DOC. 
NO. 78-475 (1944). 
9. Sloan Plan, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN: CONSERVATION, CONTROL AND USE OF WATER 
RESOURCES, S. DOC. NO. 78-191 (1944). 
10. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 29.  
11. Pick-Sloan Plan, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN:  REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CONCILIATION 
OF S. DOC. 191 AND H. DOC. 475, H.R. DOC. NO. 78-247 (1944). 
12. Section 9 of FCA 1944 reads in part:  “The general comprehensive plans set forth in 
House Document 475 and Senate Document 191, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, as 
revised and coordinated by Senate Document 247, Seventy-eighth Congress, second session, are 
hereby approved and shall be prosecuted by the War Department and the Department of the 
Interior as speedily as may be consistent with budgetary requirements.”  Flood Control Act of 
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887. 
13. SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS:  CHANGE AND 
REDISCOVERY TO WESTERN WATER POLICY 125 (1993). 
14. Zellmer, supra note 3, at 16. 
15. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 45-46. 
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industrial growth, all perceived as serving a national interest.  It was “a 
basin-wide plan most likely to yield the greatest good to the greatest 
number of people”16 and allowed for modifications when physical and 
economic conditions make necessary.17  The original Pick-Sloan 
contemplated extensive diversion of water from mainstem reservoirs to 
large canals capable of providing irrigation water to vast portions of the 
eastern Dakotas.18  This plan contemplated an annual cycle during which 
summer reservoir levels would be lowered substantially.  As events 
unfolded, irrigation in the Dakotas did not develop and navigation in the 
lower river diminished.  The resulting surplus of water in the reservoirs 
provided a basis for the surprise growth of an upstream recreation economy 
based on flat water fishing.  The surplus also allowed the Corps a level of 
flexibility in water management that it employed to respond to legal 
challenges under the Endangered Species Act and periodic drought, while 
still delivering cooling water for downstream electrical power stations and 
production of hydroelectricity at the dams.  The availability of ample 
surpluses in the reservoirs also mooted potentially nettlesome legal 
controversies involving Indian and states’ rights in river flows.  One of the 
designated purposes of the Pick-Sloan plan—marketing of water for 
industrial purposes—has been slower to materialize, although the 
legislation leaves little doubt as to this goal.  Section 6 of the FCA 1944 
reads: 
The Secretary of War is authorized to make contracts with States, 
municipalities, private concerns, or individuals, at such prices and 
on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for domestic and 
industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any 
reservoir under the control of the War Department: Provided, That 
no contracts for such water shall adversely affect then existing 
lawful uses of such water.  All moneys received from such 
 
16. S. DOC. NO. 78-191, at p. 17 (1944).  
17. Id. 
18 The Initial Stage of the Oahe Irrigation Project alone would have resulted in the diversion 
of 444,400 acre-feet of water from Oahe Dam, and irrigated 190,000 acres of land.  Allowing for 
return flows and water from downstream tributaries, the average annual depletion at Sioux City, 
Iowa, would have been 303,200 acre-feet, representing 1.3 percent of the average annual flow 
there.  Oahe Unit, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN PROJECT, SOUTH DAKOTA, H.R. DOC. NO. 90-163 
(1967).  The complete Oahe irrigation plan provided for increasing the irrigable area to 495,000 
acres, providing M & I water to 23 towns and cities, as well as fish and wildlife developments at 
twenty-nine locations.  H.R. DOC. NO., 90-163 at 3.  This doubling of irrigation, combined with 
the vastly larger proposed irrigation project in North Dakota (Garrison) would presumable have 
made an impact on downstream flows at some point, especially in dry years. 
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contracts shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States as 
miscellaneous receipts.19 
The legislative history supporting the authority to contract delivery of 
industrial water is equally straightforward.  The Sloan Plan20 contains the 
more explicit discussion, identifying industrial water clearly as a project 
purpose.21  In addition, the Sloan Plan also acknowledges that there will be 
a “greater requirement[ ] for industrial water supplies” in the future.22 
The Pick Plan identifies industrial water marketing as a project purpose 
while predictably focusing on flood control.  It also reflects with some 
emphasis that the multi-purpose objectives will evolve with the public 
interest: 
[The project] contemplates that the uses of presently authorized 
and existing multiple-purpose reservoirs will be progressively 
broadened and reapportioned as additional water is stored by the 
dams . . . . When completed the basin plan will be operated for 
maximum multiple-purpose use.  Thus preference can be given to 
the functions which contribute most significantly to the welfare 
and livelihood of the people of the various parts of the basin, and 
at the same time adequate steps may be taken to meet new 
economic situations that may arise in the future.23 
As already observed, the final version of the FCA 1944 combined the 
Pick and Sloan Plans, leaving open the issue of how to deal with the 
interdependent and potentially conflicting uses of navigation, flood control, 
hydropower, irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses. 
 
19. Flood Control Act of 1944, 66 Stat. 93, 33 U.S.C. § 708. 
20. Sloan Plan, supra note 9 at 10.  “To the extent that the uses of water are competitive, the 
use of water for domestic, agricultural, and industrial purposes should have preference.”  Page 13 
of the Report states:  “In the future there will also be greater requirements for industrial water 
supplies.” 
21. “To the extent that the several functions of water control and utilization are conflicting, 
preference should be given to those which make the greatest contribution to the well-being of the 
people and to the areas of greatest need.  To the extent that the uses of water are competitive, the 
use of water for domestic, agricultural and industrial purposes should have preference.”  Id. at 10 
and quoted in Environmental Defense Fund v. Morton, 420 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (D. Mont. 1976). 
22. Sloan Plan, supra note 8, at 13. 
23. Pick Plan, supra note 7, at 3.  MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN’S 
PICK-SLOAN PLAN:  A CASE STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY DETERMINATION 77-79 (1953) 
observes that the section authorizing the U.S. Corps of Engineers to sell surplus water was 
“particularly debated,” and further observes that “multiple purpose” means “to harness completely 
the water resources of the basin for all useful purposes. 
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IV. PRIOR EXPERIENCES WITH INDUSTRIAL WATER 
MARKETING IN THE BASIN 
Marketing water from the River for municipal or industrial purposes, 
although authorized in the original legislation, is a concept that has been 
emerging slowly.  It is only now beginning to take on momentum.  The 
emergence is marked by several Supreme Court opinions and by early 
attempts to develop water from market. 
A. THE MONTANA LITIGATION 
As part of the Pick-Sloan project the Bureau constructed the Yellowtail 
Reservoir in south central Montana and the Boysen Reservoir in Wyoming.  
Each project serves multiple purposes, including irrigation, hydropower, 
and flood control.  In 1975, the Bureau entered into contracts for the sale of 
reservoir waters for industrial purposes.  Agricultural and environmental 
interest groups filed suit seeking to enjoin the sales, arguing that the FCA 
1944 did not authorize such sales.24  The trial court’s opinion describes and 
analyzes the legislative history of Section 6 in detail, concluding that the 
FCA 1944 “authorizes use of project water for industrial purposes and also 
expressly authorizes the marketing thereof . . . .”25  The opinion also 
observes that the Pick-Sloan Plan “would develop in stages with sufficient 
flexibility to meet unforeseen changes in the physical and economic 
conditions of the area.”26  Finally, “[t]he Congressional debate also 
indicated an awareness by Congress that industrial water supplies would be 
developed through the proposed projects, and that unforeseen future events 
might dictate substantial industrial use.”27  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed, adopting with approval the district court’s 
analysis of Section 6.28  The decisions represent a sharp approval of the 
industrial marketing purpose in FCA 1944, and their analysis of Section 6 
retains validity.  We shall soon see, however, that the Supreme Court has 
held that the power to market water from the mainstem reservoirs is a 
matter for the Corps rather than the Bureau.29  Together the decisions 
established a solid set of judicial interpretations that support the marketing 
of water from reservoirs. 
 
24. Morton, 420 F. Supp. at 1040. 
25. Id. 
26 Id. at 1041. 
27 90 CONG. REC., pt. 3, 4119 (1944). 
28 Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1979). 
29. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1988). 
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B. SOUTH DAKOTA AND THE ETSI LITIGATION 
In 1974, the Wyoming State Legislature authorized its State Engineer 
to issue permits from the Madison groundwater formation to Energy 
Transportation Systems, Inc. (“ETSI”), a private joint venture, for use in a 
coal slurry pipeline designed to ship Great Plains coal to the south central 
United States.30  Coal slurry is a mixture of pulverized coal and water, and a 
slurry pipeline efficiently transports bulk coal.31  The Wyoming 
groundwater permits entitled ETSI to withdraw an average of 15,000 acre-
feet of water per year.32 
The success of the ETSI proposal depended on a world influenced by 
the OPEC oil embargo of the 1970s—a world of inflation, energy shortages, 
and regulated railroad shipping rates.33  These factors all disappeared by the 
early 1980s, and the ETSI project was ultimately abandoned.  However, the 
events that occurred during project development provided a case study for a 
time when industrial uses of reservoir water were proposed. 
The proposed ETSI well field was located adjacent to the Wyoming-
South Dakota border and presented a challenge to South Dakota’s water 
managers and policy makers.  The projected drawdown of the local 
Madison aquifer over time was a direct threat to municipal well fields in 
South Dakota, and the effect on surface water flows threatened drinking 
water and waste management, as well as environmental and aesthetic 
impacts on the tourist and outdoor recreation economy of the Black Hills 
region.34 
South Dakota faced an uneasy situation.  Its option to actively resist 
potential damage was limited to lengthy litigation with little prospect of 
success.  This situation changed dramatically when, in 1981, ETSI 
expressed a willingness to look to the Oahe Reservoir as a primary source 
for its project and to hold its Wyoming water rights as a reserve.35  A 
pipeline carrying Missouri River water from the Oahe Reservoir to 
Wyoming coal preparation stations presented South Dakota with several 
advantages. 
 
30. John P. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 347, 380 (1985); South Dakota 
and the ETSI Experience, in NEW SOURCES OF WATER FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND 
GROWTH:  INTERBASIN TRANSFERS 3.66 (1982), available at http://ufdc.ufl.edu/WL00000 
321/00001. 
31 Nancy Taylor Reed, An Analysis of Technical and Legal Issues Raised by the 
Development of Coal Slurry Pipelines, 13 HOUS. L. REV. 528, 530 (1976). 
32 South Dakota and the ETSI Experience, supra note 30, at 3.66. 
33. Id. 
34. South Dakota and the ETSI Experience, supra note 30, at 3.66. 
35. Id. at 3.68. 
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First, the proposed pipeline option avoided the need for a legal 
confrontation over the Madison aquifer water permits.  Second, it allowed a 
practical method for addressing another state issue—the delivery of reliable 
supplies for domestic and stock watering use in the open range between the 
Missouri River and the Black Hills.36  ETSI was willing to contract to 
provide water to western South Dakota communities along the pipeline 
route, a result that would otherwise be achieved only by large-scale public 
subsidy.  Third, ETSI proved willing to pay money to the State of South 
Dakota for the Oahe water right, a bold notion when viewed in the context 
of western water law systems that are based on rights claimed free of charge 
to private users.37 
Fourth, the U.S. Supreme Court in 198238 ruled that the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause precluded states from preventing exports of water from 
within their boundaries for parochial, political, or economic reasons.  In 
other words, the court’s ruling established that water is an item of 
commerce, subject to federal regulation, and states may not interfere with 
commerce in water.39  South Dakota interpreted this ruling as a precursor to 
an active water market in which it hoped to be an early entrant.  Finally, the 
timing of the ETSI proposal was significant because it coincided with a new 
requirement by the federal executive that state and local governments 
contribute a share toward federally subsidized water projects within their 
boundaries.40  At that time, economically advanced states were in a position 
to meet the local share requirement, but South Dakota, with a small 
population and an agrarian economy, was not in a position to contribute, 
making it considerably more difficult, if not impossible, to compete for 
federal subsidies.  ETSI’s willingness to pay for Oahe water thus provided a 
potential fund on which future water development would be based.41 
This innovative approach required supporting state legislation by a 
special session of the South Dakota Legislature, and as the pieces of the 
complex puzzle came into place, the Governor could summarize: 
Once this agreement began to take shape and it appeared that our 
goals with respect to preserving the Madison Formation, providing 
water to Western South Dakota communities, and obtaining 
 
36. Id. at 3.67. 
37. Id. at 3.68. 
38. Sporhase v. Neb. Ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982). 
39. Id. at 953-54 (recognizing the “Western States’ interest[ ] . . . in conserving and 
preserving scarce water resources,” while categorizing such interests as “not irrelevant” to 
commerce clause inquiry and granting Congress the “power to deal with” water problems on a 
national scale). 
40 Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082. 
41 Zellmer, supra note 3, § IV(E). 
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money for water development were actually achievable, it became 
impossible for South Dakota to reject this virtual bird in the hand 
in favor of protracted and uncertain litigation that might 
accomplish only one of our goals.42 
Success of the proposed transbasin diversion depended upon a large 
supply of unappropriated water and a legally valid state water right.  State 
water law is based on the familiar principal of seniority of rights, and the 
availability, value, and security of a right to use water is dependent on its 
original appropriation date.43  Because virtually all of the surplus water 
impounded behind the Oahe and Garrison dams was then, and is now, 
unappropriated under state law, the ETSI project developers were in a 
position to claim a secure senior water right, assuming that state water law 
governed.  South Dakota took the position that, at the least, it was entitled 
to issue state water permits from its share of natural flows from the main 
channel of the Missouri River, while holding open a potential claim to a 
share of water impounded by the federal dam.44 
Implementing the deal required special state legislation in order to 
address several specific problems.  Because the state constitution prohibited 
transfers of special privilege to private parties, it was necessary to craft 
legislation of general applicability.45  The solution was a law that would 
allow a state-chartered special district—the South Dakota Conservancy 
District—to apply for and to obtain water rights for the purpose of selling 
them to third persons for consideration in energy development use in and 
out of the state.  Nothing in the legislation was specific to ETSI, and the 
general statute remains on the books.46 
Under state water law, water rights are issued to successful applicants 
free of financial charge.47  The ETSI developers, however, were willing to 
pay the State of South Dakota for water, provided that a lawful mechanism 
for the purpose could be established.  Arranging payment to the 
Conservancy District solved this problem and, as a practical matter, put the 
 
42. Janklow, supra note 30, at 3.68-3.69. 
43. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and 
Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 383 (1985) (describing actions by states to claim “ownership” 
of waters). 
44 In a subsequent decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals left open the question of 
whether the state held an interest in Lake Oahe water.  See infra note 63. 
45. Janklow, supra note 30, at 3.69. 
46. For an overview of South Dakota’s special state-sponsored water development districts, 
see generally John H. Davidson, South Dakota’s Special Water Districts—An Introduction, 36 
S.D. L. REV. 499, 533 (1991). 
47. Id. at 530. 
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State in the business of selling water rights to energy companies, whether in 
or out of the state.48 
South Dakota’s legal strategy could not be limited to state legislation, 
however, because the water to be appropriated lay in storage behind the 
federal Oahe Dam.  In order for the State’s scheme to succeed, it required 
recognition of the state water right (and, it follows, the lucrative sales 
contract) by the appropriate federal water management agency.  However, 
the FCA 1944,49 which governs management of the Missouri River, 
delegates authority to two agencies—and the statutory difference between 
the two is substantial.  The Corps is charged with constructing the large 
dams on the main river channel and managing them for flood control, 
navigation, and hydropower.50  The Bureau, part of the Department of the 
Interior, is charged with developing projects that carry water from the main 
reservoirs to various irrigation projects to be developed in the upper basin.51  
The irrigation projects from the dams on the main channel never 
materialized and are generally agreed to be impractical.52  The mixture of 
legislative authorizations caused the Corps to construct and operate the 
dams, reservoirs, and navigation channel, while the Bureau maintained 
paper authority but few projects on the ground.53 
The laws that govern the operation of the Bureau of Reclamation 
provide water marketing authority, as well as a saving clause that states: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to 
affect or in any way interfere with the laws of any State or 
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use or distribution 
of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, 
and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of 
this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws.54 
Section 8, as it is known, requires the Bureau to conform to state law in 
the delivery of mainstem water, a constraint that was viewed at the time as 
basic by the upper basin states, which were and are concerned that state 
control may be subordinated to the Corp’s traditional preference for 
 
48. See id. at 534 (the Conservancy District “may directly acquire water rights as well as 
market water, and it can market hydroelectric power generated by its water projects.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
49. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78–534, § 2, 58 Stat. 887 (1944). 
50. William A. Hillhouse II, The Federal Law of Water Resources Development, in FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 844, 846 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974). 
51. Id. at 848. 
52. See Guhin, supra note 30, at 430 (noting the tentative but unlikely future course of the 
project). 
53. Zellmer, supra note 4, § IV. 
54. Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1902). 
           
2013] MARKETING MISSOURI RIVER WATER 13 
managing rivers for flood control and navigation.  For South Dakota, a 
reservoir withdrawal permit issued by the Bureau would be subject to 
Section 8, and would validate the ETSI water right, because section 9(c) of 
the FCA 1944 states that “reclamation . . . developments [are] to be 
undertaken by the Secretary of the Interior . . . governed by the Federal 
Reclamation Laws.”55  The State thus reasoned that a significant portion of 
the water in storage behind the Oahe Dam was intended for irrigation that 
was unlikely to be developed in the foreseeable future.  Additionally, it 
reasoned that the use of “irrigation water” ought to be governed by 
reclamation laws, including Section 8 recognition of state water permits, 
even when the waters are marketed for energy development. 
In contrast, Section 6 of the FCA 1944, as we have seen, authorizes the 
Corps to “make contracts . . . for domestic and industrial uses for surplus 
water that may be available at any reservoir under the control of” the 
Corps.56  Thus, when the Corps designates waters in the reservoirs as 
“surplus,” it can market the water independently of the states, without 
recognition of state water permits, and without risk of sale by the state.  The 
water is subject to a mere administrative permit rather than a legally 
recognizable appropriation of a property interest.  Because the Corp’s 
constitutional authority is pursuant to the Commerce Clause as expressed 
through the navigation servitude,57 it may be assumed that the Agency 
enjoys the broadest discretion in administering its statutory authority to 
market surplus water, even in the face of opposition from basin states. 
The ETSI project collapsed as economic circumstances changed, but 
the process still matters.  There was widespread opposition to the ETSI 
proposal, particularly from downstream states in the basin, as well as from 
the railroads that competed in the business of hauling coal and across whose 
tracks the slurry pipeline needed to pass.58  Most important is the federal 
court challenge brought by the lower basin states that were concerned with 
what they saw as a precedent for out-of-basin transfers at the initiative of a 
single upper basin state; the suit sought to invalidate the water marketing 
permit issued to South Dakota by the Bureau.59  The challenge raised the 
general question of whether an upper basin state, or any basin state, held 
 
55. Flood Control Act, § 9(c). 
56 33 U.S.C. § 708. 
57 See Tarlock, supra note 43, at 402 (discussing the move from limited federal power based 
on navigability to increased federal power “with the full reach of the Commerce Clause.”). 
58. Janklow, supra note 34, at 3.71. 
59 ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 498 (1988). 
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independent rights in the stored reservoir water.60  This water right was 
issued, after all, by a state rather than a federal agency.61 
The downstream states brought suit in federal district court in Nebraska 
to block the ETSI diversion from Oahe Reservoir.62  The issue then was a 
narrow one: whether Congress in the FCA 1944 intended the reservoir 
behind Oahe Dam to be a reclamation facility subject to the water 
marketing authority of the Secretary of the Interior.63  The district court 
ruled for the plaintiff lower basin states,64 and the court of appeals 
affirmed.65  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Secretary of the Interior 
lacked authority under the FCA 1944 to make a contract allowing the state 
to use and sell water, and held the contract void.66  The decision was a 
singular victory for the downstream states. 
The ETSI ruling concluded that because the reservoirs are under the 
control of the Corps, the Corps has the sole authority to market water from 
them.67  Therefore, the Corps may market water that it determines to be 
“surplus,” that is, “all water that can be made available from the reservoir 
without adversely affecting other lawful uses of the water.”68  Described in 
this way, the Corps’s assertion of power is broad and leaves open the 
question whether any basin state has independent rights in stored reservoir 
water, absent express congressional action.  The Supreme Court’s opinion 
supports a position by the Corps that it can declare reservoir water held for 
irrigation as dedicated to “project purposes,” such as hydroelectric 
generation, or it can declare water “surplus” and available for marketing 
under Section 6.  Though the Court did not directly address “the relative 
interests of the United States and South Dakota in Lake Oahe water,”69 it 
read Section 6 as granting the Corps “exclusive authority to contract to 
remove water for industrial uses” from reservoir projects, like Oahe, that 
the Corps has constructed and operates,70 and that the language of Section 6 
is “plain in every respect.”71 
 
60 Id. at 503. 
61. Id. at 505. 
62. Id. at 498. 
63. Missouri v. Andrews, 586 F. Supp. 1268, 1269 (D. Neb. 1984). 
64. Id. at 1281. 
65. Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 287 (8th Cir. 1986). 
66 ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 505. 
67. Id. at 506. 
68. Id.; see also, Guhin, supra note 30, at 378; Guhin, supra note 25, at 378. 
69. Id. at 498 n.2. 
70. Id. at 506. 
71. Id. at 505. 
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V. THE ETSI MODEL REVISITED:  THE WESTERN AREA WATER 
SUPPLY PROJECT 
Demand for industrial use water diversions from Missouri River 
reservoirs remained quiet from the ETSI period to around 2009 when oil 
and gas production in western North Dakota’s Bakken field grew rapidly.  
Until then, the prevailing view was that the region’s oil shale deposits could 
not be extracted economically, but advances in the technology of hydraulic 
fracturing now allow for cost-effective extraction, provided there is a 
bountiful supply of fresh water.72  Each well requires water not only for 
hydraulic fracturing, but also drilling, casing and maintenance of wells,73 
and demand can reach more than thirteen acre-feet per well.74  Hydraulic 
fracturing generally requires between 2.3 and 3.8 million gallons per well.  
1 to 1.5 million gallons are required to drill a Bakken formation well; 
50,000 to 100,000 gallons of water are required to drill a non-oil shale well.  
Based on current projections of Bakken region growth through 2019, 
Bakken wells could require up to 51,000 acre-feet of water.75  Inevitably, 
energy industries are looking to the Missouri River to meet this demand. 
Local groundwater supplies are unable to meet such quantities, and the 
energy industry relies on truckers to meet immediate needs.  Leaders in the 
state of North Dakota recognized a situation that resembled the ETSI case 
of the 1980s.  There was a need to finance a new water delivery system for 
ranchers and municipalities in its arid western region.  A regional boom in 
energy production was dependent on a bountiful supply of water, and state 
government perceived an opportunity to capture value from state-issued 
water rights and take advantage of an emerging market in water.  Subsumed 
in this perception was a federal-state tension over control of river water for 
industrial and municipal use. 
The result is a state-level special district known as the Western Area 
Water Supply Authority (“WAWSA”),76 and the concept is straightforward.  
State water rights in Missouri River water are held by WAWSA, which 
builds a rural-municipal water system sufficient to meet the projected long-
term needs of a large area in western North Dakota.  In the near term, this 
 
72. OMAHA DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, GARRISON DAM/LAKE 
SAKAKAWEA PROJECT, NORTH DAKOTA:  SURPLUS WATER REPORT i-iii (March 2011). 
73. Id. at ii. 
74. Id. at 3-7. 
75 Jeffrey T. Matson, Water Resources and the Oil and Gas Boom:  Impacts to States and 
Tribes, N.D. L. REV. ENERGY L. LECTURE SER. (Mar. 14-15, 2013). 
76  N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-40-01 to 09 (2013). 
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system will have considerable excess capacity that will be made available to 
the thirsty energy industry.  Revenue from sales to energy users will retire 
as much as 80 percent of the system’s cost.  The original construction costs 
will be met by loans from the state.77  What South Dakota was unable to 
achieve in the 1980s is now likely to occur in North Dakota.  The principal, 
and important, difference is that whereas the ETSI pipeline would have 
exported Missouri River water from the basin, the North Dakota project 
will use the water in the basin although its use will be almost entirely 
consumptive, generating no return flows.78  As in the case of ETSI, 
however, WAWSA moves forward without addressing the question of legal 
control over waters impounded in the reservoirs.  The assumption is that the 
North Dakota project’s water right will not, when added to all other state 
water permits in river water, exceed North Dakota’s equitable share of the 
river’s natural flow.  Of course, that equitable share has not been 
established.  The fact that WAWSA’s water will be drawn from the 
Missouri River under a North Dakota water permit does not implicate the 
issue of rights in stored reservoir water. 
VI. MARKETING OF INDUSTRIAL WATER BY THE CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS 
Spurred by changes in the energy economy, the concept of water 
marketing pursuant to the FCA 1944 is finally taking on a concrete form.  
Although the Corps has had legislative authority through Section 6, it is 
only now building the administrative structure necessary for 
implementation.  In doing so, it is breaking new ground. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As a direct result of this growth in production, oil producers also 
approached the Corps requesting Missouri River water from Lake 
Sakakawea, behind Garrison Dam.  The agency responded by concluding 
that 100,000 acre-feet of surplus water is available to meet oil field needs 
for the next ten years,79 and offered contracts of five years with a right of 
renewal for another five. 
The Corp’s decision to provide surplus water for industrial use is based 
in part on its conclusion that the oil field demand is “of a temporary 
 
77 Western Area Water Supply Project, available at http://www.wawsp.com/facts.asp (last 
visited June 6, 2013). 
78 The North Dakota legislature does not prohibit the authority from selling water outside 
the basin.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-40-05(6) (2013). 
79. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, OMAHA DIST. GARRISON DAM/LAKE SAKAKAWEA 
SURPLUS WATER REPORT & ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, add. 1 (2012). 
           
2013] MARKETING MISSOURI RIVER WATER 17 
purpose.”80  Although the Corp’s report does not provide the basis for so 
concluding, it must be that there are ultimately a finite number of wells to 
be drilled and serviced; whether that finite number will be reached in five, 
ten, or fifty years, it does not say.  Nonetheless, it is significant that the 
contracts are to be granted on the basis of an assumption that they are 
temporary. 
Currently, the Corps is reacting only to specific requests for surplus 
water from the North Dakota reservoir.  In order to satisfy these requests, it 
elected to proceed to issue Surplus Water Reports for each of the six main-
stem reservoirs and allocate specific quantities for each.  In total, just under 
283,000 acre-feet is allocated from the combined reservoirs. 
Whether water is surplus within the meaning of Section 6 is based on a 
simple determination that water in a reservoir is “not required because the 
authorized use for the water never developed or the need was reduced by 
changes that occurred since authorization of construction.”81  Because the 
original Sloan Plan contemplated irrigation across vast acreages of the 
Dakotas, none of which has occurred, the determination that there is water 
surplus to project purposes is an easy one.  Consider, as a single example, 
that the Oahe irrigation project in South Dakota alone would have diverted 
from the Oahe reservoir 444,000 acre-feet per year.82  The current Surplus 
Water Report for the Oahe reservoir allocates only 57,317 acre-feet for 
industrial water uses, a small percentage of the water for irrigation which 
never developed. 
The Corp’s current industrial water marketing proposals conclude that 
the Pick-Sloan Plan contemplated that a total of 3,853,000 acre-feet of 
impounded reservoir waters in the system was for use in irrigation projects 
which have not developed.83  By the Corp’s reasoning, all of this is now 
available for industrial water marketing in the event that demand should 
arise.  In addition, a realistic appraisal supports a prediction that the steady 
decline in navigation on the River will continue, thereby freeing an 
additional large supply of reservoir water to meet alternative demand. 
 
80 U.S. ARMY CORPS. OF ENGINEERS, ER 1105-2-100, PLANNING GUIDANCE NOTEBOOK, 
para. E-57(b)(2)(b) (2000), available at http://planning.usace.army mil/toolbox/library/ 
ERs/entire.pdf. 
81. Id. at E-57(b)(2)(a)(1). 
82. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, INITIAL STAGE, 
OAHE UNIT, PICK-SLOAN MISSOURI BASIN PROGRAM, South Dakota III-5, III-6 (1973).  HD 163, 
Oahe Unit, xxvi pegs the amount at 408,400 acre-feet.  The Oahe Project was de-authorized by 
Congress in 1982. 
83. OMAHA DISTRICT, supra note 72, at 2-10. 
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B. DEFINING SURPLUS WATER 
Section 6 of the FCA 1944 simply authorizes the Corps to contract “at 
such prices and on such terms as [it] may deem reasonable, for domestic 
and industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir 
under” its control.84  The statute is silent as to whether the uses contracted 
for must be temporary, but does require that they not adversely affect “then 
existing lawful uses.”85  Agency regulations restate the statutory language 
that surplus water is water “that may be available at any reservoir . . .  
because the authorized use for the water never developed or the need was 
reduced by changes that occurred since authorization and 
construction . . . .”86  This regulation is rooted in a 1986 opinion by the 
Army General Counsel which concluded: 
In my opinion section 6 of the Flood Control Act gives the 
Secretary of the Army similar authority to market water stored in 
the Pick-Sloan flood control reservoirs.  The Reclamation Projects 
Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to reallocate and market 
water not needed to fulfill the paramount reclamation purpose of 
irrigation.  Section 6 of the Flood Control Act provides the 
Secretary of the Army similar authority with regard to water he 
determines is not needed to fulfill a project purpose in Army 
reservoirs.87 
The Corp’s interpretation of the phrase “surplus water” is sensible on 
its face and is entitled to deference according to recent Supreme Court 
opinions.88  There are opposing views, however, founded in the Corp’s own 
method of labeling and categorizing waters captured in its Missouri River 
reservoirs.  The method describes basin-wide allocations of total storage 
capacity as:  (1) Permanent Pool, 25%; (2) Carryover Multiple Use, 53%; 
(3) Annual Flood Control and Multiple Use, 16%; and (4) Exclusive Flood 
Control, 6%.89  The Corp’s interpretation is that allocations (2)-(4) are 
available as “surplus waters.” 
 
84. Flood Control Act of 1944, 66 Stat. 93, 33 U.S.C. § 708. 
85. Id.  It is noted that the Oahe Irrigation Project was deauthorized by Congress and is not, 
therefore, an existing lawful use. 
86. PLANNING GUIDANCE NOTEBOOK, supra note 80, ER 1105-2-100, ¶ 3-8(b)(4), and  
¶ E-57(b)(2)(a)(1). 
87 Dep’t of the Army, Office of the General Counsel, Proposed Contracts for Municipal 
and Industrial Water Withdrawals from Main Stem Missouri Reservoirs, (Mar. 13, 1986). 
88 In City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (U.S. 2013), Justice 
Scalia for the Court wrote that the question is always “simply, whether the agency has stayed 
within the bounds of its statutory authority,” and finally, “whether the statutory text forecloses the 
agency’s assertion of authority, or not.” 
89 FERRELL, supra note 1 at 128. 
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Guhin, in his 1985 milestone article The Law of the Missouri,90 argues 
that “surplus waters” are not “all” waters91 but are limited to waters 
captured for the purpose of flood control.  This interpretation would limit 
the Corp’s Section 6 authority to Annual Flood Control and/or Exclusive 
Flood Control at the most—22% or 6% respectively.  Even if Guhin’s 
argument is accepted, however, waters allocated by the Corps to flood 
control in the basin total 16.4 million acre-feet, a considerable amount.  The 
Corp’s regulations, in contrast, define all but the Permanent Pool as 
potentially available for “surplus” designation, an additional 53%. 
C. REVISING PROJECT PURPOSES, REALLOCATING PROJECT WATER 
The Corp’s regulations do more than restate the Section 6 language, 
however.  They declare that surplus water also includes “water that would 
be more beneficially used as municipal and industrial water than for the 
authorized purpose and which, when withdrawn, would not significantly 
affect authorized purposes over some specified time period.”92  Going 
considerably further, the regulation states that the agency has the authority 
to: 
[M]ake reasonable reallocations between different project 
purposes. Thus, water stored for purposes no longer necessary can 
be considered surplus.  In addition, the Secretary may use his 
broad discretionary authority to reduce project outputs, envisioned 
at the time of authorization and construction, if it is believed that 
the municipal and industrial use of the water is a higher and more 
beneficial use . . . .”93 
Although the specific contracts under consideration—small diversions 
from Sakakawea for oil and gas production—fit neatly within the more 
confined definition, the regulatory umbrella under which the agency claims 
to be acting is strikingly broad, perhaps as broad as the constitutional 
authority of the FCA 1944 itself.  Reducing project outputs and making 
“reasonable reallocations” so that it is “more beneficially used . . . [for] a 
municipal and industrial water than for the authorized purpose” is a broad 
claim of agency authority.94 
 
90 See generally Guhin, supra note 30. 
91  Id. at 180. 
92  OMAHA DISTRICT, supra note 72, at 1-2.  
93.  Id.  
94.  Id. 
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D. TEMPORARY USES ONLY? 
Section 6 does not stipulate that industrial water contracts must be for 
temporary, time-limited uses only.  Although the Corp’s report on the 
proposed Sakakawea contracts emphasizes that they are to simply meet 
“urgent temporary” demands95 the agency regulations in this case are also 
considerably broader, stating “[s]urplus water agreements will normally be 
for small amounts of water and/or for temporary use as opposed to storage 
reallocations and a permanent right to that storage. . . . Normally, surplus 
water agreements will be limited to 5 year periods.”96 
The regulations leave open the question of whether the FCA 1944 
allows the Corps to enter into long-term industrial or municipal water use 
contracts, perhaps for energy projects such as the coal slurry pipeline 
envisioned by the original ETSI proposal, or to respond to lasting regional 
water shortages in densely populated areas outside of the Missouri basin. 
VII. PRICING RIVER WATER—COMMODITIZING RIVER WATER 
The Corp’s new proposals to market industrial water specify that the 
water will be sold.  The administrative process is that current demand will 
be met by issuing five-year contracts, with no charge for water until the 
conclusion of the formal establishment of a pricing policy, which will be 
the result of notice and comment rulemaking.97  Upon the adoption of a 
pricing policy, existing contracts will be revised, and charges imposed.98 
What the Corps is doing in the Missouri basin is a surprise only 
because it has not occurred before.  The FCA 1944 clearly calls for the 
Corps to do precisely what it is doing.  What has been absent until now is 
demand.  The demand that has arisen—delivery of water to North Dakota 
oil and gas fields—is described as temporary, which it may be, although it 
must be noted that most oil fields remain productive for lengthy periods.  
By emphasizing its authority to reallocate, and by undertaking a more 
permanent reallocation study, the Corps recognizes that new and more 
enduring uses are likely to emerge. 
 
95. OMAHA DISTRICT, supra note 72, at 1-3. 
96 Id. 
97 Memorandum from Dep’t of Army, Office of the Ass’t Sec’t Civil Works (May 8, 2012). 
98. Establishing a price for surplus water will be an unprecedented undertaking, and is not 
analyzed here in detail.  The questions that must be answered in the process are fascinating.  Will 
the baseline be the cost of alternative methods of delivering water?  Will cost include 
reimbursable expenses of the Pick-Sloan project, including capital costs, interest, operation, and 
maintenance?  Will cost reflect the irrigation water subsidy and exclude interest?  Will cost take 
loss of ecosystem services into account or ecosystem mitigation? 
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At the time of this writing, the Corps has yet to publish notice of a rule-
making process for industrial water pricing, and the context of that notice is 
open to speculation; however, certain preliminary issues are presented here.  
An open market for reservoir water is a first option, and there is abundant 
literature on the nature of and process for reaching a proper price for a 
scarce natural resource.99  It is possible that the Corps will utilize some 
form of bid or other open call device.  Even in an auction format, however, 
the seller is entitled to establish a minimum, thus presenting the question 
whether the Corps is either authorized or required to include minimum 
elements in its price.  It is likely, for example, that the Corps will charge the 
equivalent of a connection fee to gain access to the reservoir supply, as well 
as a service charge to cover costs that are not related to the quantity 
diverted. 
Section 6, itself, is silent on the elements of pricing and specifies only 
that the monies be “deposited in the Treasury of the United States as 
miscellaneous receipts.”100  When revenues from a federal water resources 
development project are involved—and the Pick-Sloan project in 
particular—certain complicating questions emerge.  When the Pick-Sloan 
project was approved in the Flood Control Act of 1944, specific purposes 
were identified and portions of overall costs assigned to each.  Some of 
these purposes were deemed to serve a broad national interest and the 
assigned costs therefore absorbed by the taxpayer directly.  Such is the case 
with flood control, navigation, recreation, and wildlife, which are referred 
to as “non-reimbursable” costs of the project.  Such non-reimbursable costs 
are not included in the repayment obligation of Pick-Sloan purposes.  In 
contrast, a portion of the overall project cost was designated as 
“reimbursable.”  The primary example is the project costs assigned to 
hydroelectric generation which are required to be repaid to the government 
with interest over a period as long as or exceeding fifty years.  
Reimbursable costs also carry an obligation to repay operation, 
maintenance, and replacement costs.  In the Pick-Sloan project all 
reimburseables are paid into a common basin-wide account. 
The legislative history of Pick-Sloan supports an argument that 
municipal and industrial water is a reimbursable project cost and that prices 
charged for water must include such elements as repayment of project costs 
 
99 The proper price of a scarce resource is a question that has interested economists from 
early days of the discipline.  One introduction is HENRIQUE MONTEIRO, WATER PRICING 
MODELS:  A SURVEY (2005). 
100 For example, the cost and repayment schedule for the initial stage of the Oahe irrigation 
project detailed specific repayment obligations assigned to municipal and industrial water.  See 
H.R. DOC. 90-163, supra note 18, at 6. 
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with interest, operation, maintenance, and replacement, as well as a charge 
for storage in the reservoir.  Moreover, if reimbursable, revenues should be 
paid into the basin account.  Subsequent agency planning supports this 
argument as well.  For example, in the original authorization of the first 
phase of a now de-authorized Oahe irrigation project, it was specified that 
municipal and industrial water “would provide repayment over a period of 
fifty years at 3 and 1/8% interest of costs allocated to this purpose”101 and 
consistently referred to municipal and industrial water revenues as 
reimbursable,102 including repayment of operation, maintenance and 
replacement expenses.103  Since 1986, the Corps has held the position that 
water sold for municipal and industrial purposes should include a charge for 
reservoir storage.104  An associated, but vital, issue is whether water pricing 
should include hydroelectric sales lost or foregone as one result of 
municipal and industrial water sales.  In a 1986 opinion of the General 
Counsel, it is stated: 
In my opinion the Secretary of the Army has the discretion to 
market water in Lake Sakakawea even if this results in a decrease 
of the project’s actual or potential power production.  Section 6 
was included in the Flood Control Act to empower the Secretary 
of the Army to make reasonable reallocations between the 
different project purposes.105 
In other words, the Corps can favor water marketing over other project 
purposes when circumstances warrant such a change.  Because revenues 
from hydroelectric generation are the fundamental source of revenue for the 
Pick-Sloan basin account, it is unlikely that the Corps would reduce them 
without a replacement in the form of revenue from municipal and industrial 
sales. 
In contrast to the argument that revenues from water sales are 
reimbursable and payable to the Pick-Sloan basin account is the clear 
language of Section 6, specifying that revenue from water sales be 
deposited with the U.S. Treasury “as miscellaneous receipts.”  
Reimbursable costs of Pick-Sloan are paid into a basin account and not to 
the general accounts of the United States.  If Congress in 1944 had intended 
the costs allocated to water sales to be reimbursable, it would have so 
specified.  Instead, it created an unambiguous exception. 
 
101 Oahe Unit, MISSOURI RIVER BASIN PROJECT, SOUTH DAKOTA, H.R. DOC. 90-163, at 
25 (1st Sess. 1967). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See supra note 82, at 10. 
105 Id. 
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These and other issues will arise when and if the Corps publishes a 
notice of rule-making.  It is sufficient here to state that the process will 
involve far more than the establishment of market price.  Beyond the 
technicalities of price-setting, a formal process of water marketing, once 
clearly established, is likely to have far-ranging effects.  This argument 
asserts that once a reliable price and sale process is established, new 
demand will appear.  Industries and municipalities across the nation are 
gradually outgrowing their usable local water supplies.  The rate at which 
this is occurring is accelerating because of climate, deteriorating quality of 
available local sources, increasing consumption, and concentration of 
population in water-short regions.  Historically, water has been viewed as a 
local resource, but modern technologies now make long distance water 
transfer an economical and technologically feasible alternative.106  With a 
predictable pricing mechanism in place, long-term economic calculations 
become predictable, legal questions mostly resolved, and an open market 
will exist. 
VIII.THE PERMANENT REALLOCATION OPTION:  
APPORTIONMENT? 
In addition to undertaking the sale of surplus water, the Corps has 
initiated a study to determine whether the waters captured by the Pick-Sloan 
dams should be permanently re-allocated.  Titled the Missouri River 
Municipal & Industrial Water Storage Reallocation Study, the study 
according to the Corps “will systematically and comprehensively examine 
whether some amount of the storage [in Pick-Sloan dams] may be allocated 
solely to municipal and industrial water supply.”107  The study is based 
specifically on a 1970 statute which states: 
The Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief of Engineers, 
is authorized to review the operation of projects the construction of 
which has been completed and which were constructed in the 
interest of navigation, flood control, water supply and related 
purposes, when found advisable due to significantly changed 
physical or economic conditions, and to report thereon to Congress 
with recommendations on the advisability of modifying the 
 
106 Those who suggest that large scale long distance transfers are unrealistic are reminded 
that in 2002, China began construction of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project which will 
pipe 44 billion cubic meters of Yangtze River water to the Yellow River. 
107 Press Release, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Missouri River Mun. & Indus. Water 
Storage Reallocation Study (Sept. 7, 2002). 
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structure or their operation and for improving the quality of the 
environment in the overall public interest.108 
This reallocation study supplements the Corp’s existing assertion of 
authority to reallocate among project purposes when a new use “is a higher 
and more beneficial use.”109  Although not so stated explicitly, the study is a 
long-term effort to obtain Congressional recognition of the obvious fact that 
Pick-Sloan irrigation water is surplus and available for alternative purposes. 
The format of this option is a formal report and set of recommendations 
to Congress.  Were the Corp’s final report to specify an amount to each 
state and tribe as its equitable share of the natural flow of the river, and, 
were Congress to formally adopt the reallocation recommendations, it is 
likely that a full apportionment will have occurred.110 
IX. THE PROSPECT OF OUT-OF-BASIN TRANSFERS 
The Corp’s water marketing plans place no restrictions on out-of-basin 
transfers, and the legislation makes no reference to any such limits.  
Although large-scale transbasin diversions have not been prevalent in recent 
years, the idea is hardly new.  For example, when Congress created the 
National Water Commission (“NWC”) in 1973, it included in its charge an 
instruction that it identify alternative ways of meeting future water needs, 
“giving consideration, among other things, to . . . interbasin 
transfers . . . .”111  In its report, the NWC recognized that interbasin 
transfers were already numerous, and that: 
As economic demand for water increases, as available water 
supplies in areas of shortage shrink, as technological capability 
improves, and as national income grows, the feasibility of 
interbasin transfers increases and the scale of the proposals grow 
larger.112 
In the ETSI litigation, the lower basin states objected to the coal slurry 
project because it diverted water from the river basin; ETSI was a classic 
transbasin diversion.  Under the current Corps proposal, there are no limits 
on place of use, and the prospects for moving water out of the basin appear 
realistic, particularly when combined with a reliable pricing system. There 
 
108 Rivers and Harbors, Flood Control Acts of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 216, 84 Stat. 
1818 (1970). 
109 See ER 1105-2-100, Parag. E-57b(2)(a)(2). 
110. See generally Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000). 
111. Nat’l Water Comm’n Act, Pub. L. No. 90-515. § 3(a)(1), 82 Stat. 868, 868 (1968). 
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is no clear avenue, other than through Congress, by which the states may 
assert their interest in keeping the River’s water within the basin. 
X. THE ECOSYSTEM EFFECTS OF WATER COMMODITIZATION 
Commoditizing reservoir water raises the issue whether the millions of 
acre-feet of available surplus water will be marketed in balance with other 
project purposes.  The Corps is unlikely to fail to meet its obligation to 
serve purposes such as hydropower and navigation, which represent 
conventional economic value.  But, will the same balance be struck when 
competing uses are fish, wildlife and the delivery of ecosystem services? 
The Corps has elected to prepare individual environmental impact 
statements for its industrial water-marketing program on a reservoir-by-
reservoir basis, and based on the limited amounts allocated in the initial 
proposals.  However, the wording of the statute and regulations, combined 
with the effect of the ETSI litigation, make clear that the current proposals, 
although described in limited terms, actually authorize marketing of all 
waters “not required because the authorized use for the water never 
developed.”  Thus, what is lacking is a cumulative environmental analysis 
that considers the potential effect of an active and growing transbasin 
demand for a large portion of the supply now made available for marketing. 
XI. THE PLACE OF TRIBES AND STATES IN A FEDERAL WATER 
MARKETING SYSTEM 
The states and tribes in the basin do not have a strong position.  
Predictably, they argue that the waters retained behind the federal dams are 
actually just the flowing waters of the stream, which are under their control 
and subject to their power to allocate through water permits or other 
procedure.  In the ETSI decision, the United States Supreme Court did not 
address directly “the relative interests of the United States and South 
Dakota in Lake Oahe water”113 but it did read the language of Section 6 as 
granting the Corps “exclusive authority to contract to remove water for 
industrial uses” from reservoir projects, like Oahe, that the Corps has 
constructed and operates.114  The Court found the language of Section 6 
“plain in every respect.”115 
The legal issue is the Corp’s power over impounded water and whether 
water stored by the government in federal reservoirs is itself a source of 
power to allow allocation independent of the states and tribes.  Professor 
 
113 ETSI Pipeline Project, 484 U.S. at 498 n.2. 
114. Id. at 506. 
115. Id. at 505. 
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Trelease describes the power in this way: “[i]mpounded water, not 
appropriated by any person, could be similarly regarded as the property of 
the United States, and this theory could be used to justify the distribution of 
water by sale to those who would enter into contractual relations with the 
United States . . . .”116 
In 1975, the pending ETSI pipeline proposal led to hearings in the 
United States Senate.117  The Corp’s statement at that time included the 
following: 
The States have authority to grant permits for the use of the natural 
flow taken from the river.  The right of the Federal Government to 
control the use of water in its reservoirs is based upon the 
legislation authorizing the construction and operation of the 
reservoirs and upon Federal jurisdiction over navigated 
waterways.118 
The Corp’s initiatives under Section 6 today are consistent with that earlier 
statement; the agency claims jurisdiction over waters stored in the 
reservoirs. 
States can no doubt issue a water permit under state law from the 
state’s equitable share of the flowing river.  However, the case is different 
when the water to be diverted under the state permit is available only 
because of the storage capacity provided by the federal reservoirs.  Is the 
water, once captured and stored pursuant to federal law, no longer subject to 
state law?  The question has not been answered by the courts, but the 
argument exists that the Corps has the full power to allocate waters stored 
in its reservoirs. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The current industrial water marketing proposals return us to the 
persistent issue: are river waters mere economic commodities, to be sold or 
moved about when economic demand arises, or are they public amenities, 
and thereby insulated from the full rigors of the marketplace?  By way of 
the Pick-Sloan plan, the Missouri River is already heavily committed to 
serving short-term economic interests, particularly in the delivery of 
flowing water for navigation, hydropower, power plant cooling, as well as 
flat water for recreation. While industrial water marketing proposals are 
 
116. Frank J. Trelease, Arizona v. California:  Allocation of Water Resources to People, 
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currently quite small in relation to the overall supply, they provide a lens 
through which to observe an alternative future. 
The development of WAWSA by North Dakota, along with the earlier 
case of South Dakota’s ETSI proposal, are significant because they 
represent one state initiating a sizeable diversion without consulting the 
other states and tribes in the basin.  Similarly, the Corps is initiating its 
marketing program without fully integrating the states and the tribes into 
the administrative process.  Thus, by a series of ad hoc decisions, basin 
waters are committed without reference to any agreed upon principles to 
govern the use of the common resource.  More fundamentally, this process 
ignores the obvious fact that the waters of the Missouri River are 
interconnected and part of a single hydrologic system.  As stated earlier in 
this essay, the modern history of the basin is that of an inability of basin 
states to achieve any level of accord in river management.  Recent events 
suggest that the history is continuing. 
 
